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Given the aging of the U.S. population, and the greater contributions of older workers to 
the labor force, understanding how policy levers can affect elderly labor supply has 
become increasingly important.  In this paper we use data from the Health and 
Retirement Study linked to state identifiers to estimate the responsiveness of the labor 
supply of older workers to the wage and features of the tax code, both on the probability 
of participating in the labor market, as well as on hours of work for those who choose to 
work.  We find that a 10 percent increase in the wage is associated with a five percent 
increase in participation, and we estimate slightly larger responses to marginal tax rates. 
These results suggest that government policies could increase the labor supply of older 
individuals by changing the returns to work through the tax code. 
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   1I.  Introduction 
  Even before the downturn in the stock market began in 2000, the decades-long trend in 
earlier retirement had started to reverse, as the oldest baby boomers were delaying retirement.  
Evidence for this is presented in Figure 1, which shows the labor force participation rate for men 
aged 66-85.
1  The subsequent reduction in the value of many seniors’ retirement portfolios may 
have heightened this trend.   
The aging of the U.S. population, combined with an increasing probability that any given 
older individual will work, means that the contributions of older workers to the labor force are 
rising.  Understanding how policy levers can affect the labor supply of the elderly therefore has 
become increasingly important.   In this paper we use data from the Health and Retirement Study 
(HRS) linked to state identifiers to estimate the responsiveness of the labor supply of older workers 
to features of the tax code, both on the probability of participating in the labor market, as well as on 
hours of work for those who choose to work   Other research has attempted to examine the effects 
of the tax structure on the labor force decisions of older workers.  However, it generally suffers 
from some of the traditional problems associated with the labor supply literature.  Specifically, 
variation in federal tax rates comes entirely from individual-level potential earnings, which are a 
function of past labor force decisions and are likely to be correlated with tastes for work. 
Our data allow us to use individual-level information from earnings histories as well as 
state- and year-level variation in the tax treatment of earned income, Social Security income, and 
pension income to identify variation in the returns to work faced by older workers.  Our measure of 
the marginal tax rate an individual faces varies due the interactions between individual potential 
earnings and state- and year- differences in the tax code.  The interaction of these multiple sources 
of variation allow us to estimate labor supply responses while better controlling for factors which 
could be correlated with tastes for work.   We find evidence that the labor supply of older workers is 
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in the potential wage increases labor force participation by approximately five percent for both men 
and women.  Responses to the tax code are slightly higher, in that an increase of 10 percent in the 
after-tax return to work leads to an increase in labor force participation of 7.5 percent among men 
and 11.4 percent among women.  However we find that among those who choose to participate in 
the labor force, neither the wage or tax rate has a significant effect on hours worked. 
Our results have important policy implications.   Understanding how wages and various 
features of both the federal tax code and state tax structures may either encourage or discourage 
older individuals to work is critical for understanding the effects of potential changes in the Social 
Security system on labor supply, as well as to understanding the role that the increased labor supply 
of older workers might play in the long-run viability of the Social Security system.  Our results 
suggest that government policies could play a role in increasing the labor supply of older 
individuals by changing the returns to work through the tax code.  In addition, our findings are 
encouraging for firms who may be looking for tools to attract or retain older workers because of 
their skills or experience.    
II. Background 
In standard life-cycle models of labor supply, retirement is a one-time decision.  However, 
as noted by Maestas (2004), 24% of all retirees exhibit “unretirement,” defined as a reversal in labor 
force participation.  Unretirees return to the labor force after partially or fully retiring.  It is unclear 
why individuals would retire and then return to the labor force.  If there are significant costs 
associated with retiring and then returning to the labor force, one would not expect to see so many 
cases of unretirement.   
   3One possible explanation is that the elderly return to work as a result of poor financial 
planning.  However, recent work casts doubt on this explanation.  Haider and Loughran (2001) find 
that labor supply among the elderly is concentrated among the healthiest, wealthiest, and most 
educated older individuals, and that these individuals earn relatively low wages.  They interpret 
these findings as indicating that work is more like leisure for these older workers, and that the return 
to working in the form of the wage does not have a large effect on the labor force decisions of older 
individuals.
2  Consistent with Haider and Loughran, Maestas (2004) finds that retirees who return to 
work have not suffered from poor financial planning, inadequate resources, or negative wealth 
shocks, and that they had higher pre-retirement earnings and education than retirees who remain out 
of the labor force.  
Of the other economic factors potentially affecting labor supply decisions of the elderly, the 
Social Security earnings test has been studied most extensively.  However, the many papers on the 
earnings test fail to reach a consensus on its effects.  Friedberg (2000) uses three changes in the 
earnings test between 1978 and 1990 that differentially affect particular age groups to examine the 
effects on labor supply.  She estimates small but statistically significant income and wage 
elasticities of elderly labor supply among workers, but finds no evidence of effects on the decision 
to work.  Gruber and Orszag (2003) use the same policy changes (and an additional change in 1996-
1998) to analyze the effect of the earnings test on the decision to work and on aggregate hours, and 
find no influence on labor supply decisions of men.  Haider and Loughran (2008) find that when 
allowing for measurement error and rigidities in the labor market, changes in the earnings test have 
had substantial effects on the labor supply decisions of men.  Song and Manchester (2007) analyze 
the removal of the earnings test in 2000 for persons at the full retirement age or older, and find large 
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th to 80
th percentiles, but no effect 
on earnings at lower levels, and find no clear effect on labor force participation.   
Despite the extensive literature on the effects of the Social Security earnings test on the 
labor supply of older workers, and an even more extensive literature on the effects of the income tax 
code on the labor supply of prime-age workers (see Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) and Pencavel 
(1986) for reviews of this literature), relatively little work examines the effects of the income tax 
code on elderly labor supply.  One exception is work by Favreault et al (1999) that estimates the 
effects of the federal tax code (income taxes, the employee share of payroll taxes, and reduced 
Social Security benefits from the earnings test) on the labor supply of older workers. They examine 
both the extensive margin of labor force participation, and the intensive margin of hours worked, 
using data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) linked to Social Security 
Summary Earnings Records and Master Beneficiary Records.  They calculate an individual’s 
“potential earnings,” which is an approximation of the labor income the person could gain through 
employment, based on the past covered wages from the Social Security earnings histories.  They 
find a large effect of federal tax rates on the participation decision.  However, their variation comes 
entirely from individual-level potential earnings, which are a function of past labor force decisions 
and are likely to be correlated with tastes for work.  They also do not model taxes at the state level, 
and therefore their approach cannot speak to whether two otherwise identical individuals with the 
same earnings history will respond to differences in net wage rates generated by the tax system.   
In the United States, there is a great deal of cross-state variation in both marginal tax rates 
and the tax treatment of pension and Social Security income.  Table 1 summarizes some features of 
state tax rules in 2003.  The state marginal tax rate on labor market earnings varies from zero to 
almost ten percent across the 50 states.
3  Resulting differences in the after-tax wage may be 
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elderly, substitution effects are more likely to dominate income effects in labor supply decisions. In 
addition, interactions of nonlabor income with the graduated structure of our income tax code may 
further reduce the incentive to work for older workers.  Retiree income, to the extent that it is 
taxable, often increases the marginal tax rate a potential worker faces on their earnings.  Thus, the 
after-tax wage they earn is lower than it was before they started to receive retiree income.   
Cross-state differences in the tax treatment of pension and Social Security income could 
therefore lead to large differences in the financial reward to working, particularly for individuals 
with substantial nonlabor income.  Take for example, a single elderly man who receives $30,000 in 
pension income, $6,000 in Social Security income, and no other income. Given the usual federal 
and state exemptions and deductions, his total tax liability (combined federal and state) is $5,357 if 
he lives in Wisconsin, but it is $3,705 (about 30 percent lower) if he lives in Michigan. 
Furthermore, the marginal tax rate he would face (again, from combined federal and state taxes) if 
he began to work is 15 percent if he lives in Michigan and 22.3 percent if he lives in Wisconsin.  
Despite the fact that his gross income is the same in both states, his after-tax annuity income and 
potential after-tax wage are quite different.  As a result the incentives to work are quite different 
depending on his state of residence.  In addition to being interesting from a policy perspective, these 
state differences provide variation in after-tax wages with which to estimate labor supply 
equations.
4   
In this paper, we examine the importance of wages and taxes on the labor supply decision, 
using a dataset that allows us to do so more precisely than has been possible in the past.  The HRS 
data, described in the next section, contain detailed work histories, which allow us to create 
measures of potential wages for both workers and non-workers.  In addition, through restricted 
   6access data, we can observe the state of residence of all the respondents, allowing us to model the 
federal and state income taxes they face. 
III.  Data 
We use data on individuals ages 70 to 84 from the 1998, 2000, and 2002 waves of the 
Health and Retirement Study (HRS).  The HRS is a nationally representative panel dataset that 
began in 1992. The study interviewed individuals ages 51 to 61 in 1992 and has been re-
interviewing them every two years since then.  In 1998, when the original sample was ages 57 to 67, 
the HRS merged with the AHEAD survey, a survey of individuals who were ages 75 and older in 
1998. New respondents who were ages 68-74 or 51-56 were also added, making the survey a 
representative sample of individuals who were ages 51 and older in 1998.  
The HRS contains detailed data on many of the factors that would influence labor supply 
decisions.  Studies of labor supply are typically limited by the fact that wages are unobservable for 
non-workers.  Researchers must impute a wage using observable characteristics and a variety of 
controversial assumptions.  However, HRS respondents are asked a variety of questions about their 
prior jobs, including what their earnings or wages were, and the occupation and industry of the job. 
Using these data, we can construct a potential wage for all individuals, regardless of their current 
employment status.
5   
In addition to the wage, the HRS contains rich measures of financial well being, health, and 
family structure that should affect tastes for work.  Because the HRS identifies respondents’ state of 
residence, we are able to model features of state income taxes discussed in the previous section that 
could have strong effects on the incentive to work.
6   
IV.  Methodology 
A.  Estimating Determinants of Labor Force Participation 
   7The key economic factors influencing whether an individual works are the return to working 
and his or her level of nonlabor income.  Personal characteristics such as health and marital status 
may also be important determinants of the labor supply decision. We estimate logits of labor force 
participation of the form:  
() 12 3 4 ln ln 1 ln it o it ijt it it j jt it
j
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where i indexes the individual, j indexes the state in which the individual resides, and t 
indexes the year.  In this equation, L equals 1 if the individual works and equals zero otherwise.
7  w 
represents the potential wage available to the worker, τ represents the marginal tax rate on the first 
dollar of earnings, and I is a measure of nonlabor income.  The X vector captures a number of 
individual-level characteristics.  We describe these variables in greater detail in the following 
paragraphs.  In addition, we include U, the county level unemployment rate in a given survey year, 
to account for regional fluctuations in labor demand.  We also control for state fixed effects, S, in all 
of our analyses to capture the effects of any time-invariant state characteristics that may affect labor 
supply.  This is important because some of these characteristics may be correlated with the tax 
structure of the state.
8  Finally, we adjust our standard errors to reflect the fact that the same 
individuals may be present in multiple waves of the HRS.   
We restrict our sample to individuals 70 and older because most of these individuals will 
already have retired from their “career jobs.”
9  By focusing on the population that has already 
retired, we are implicitly treating previous labor supply histories as exogenous to post-retirement 
labor supply decisions.
10  This is a reasonable assumption for much of the population if, during their 
working years, individuals assume that they will retire at some point close to age 65.  Because 
individuals who have retired from a job but are currently working for pay may be less likely to 
identify as retired, we select our sample of “retirees” based on age, rather than a respondent’s self-
   8reported retirement status. This avoids sample selection bias that would arise if we selected our 
sample based on self-reported retirement status.  We exclude individuals who are or were self-
employed mainly because wage measures were often missing and noisy for them.
11 In addition, 
retirement may be a more gradual process for the self-employed, and as a result, the dynamics of 
their labor supply decisions may be quite different than that of workers. 
As discussed earlier, many studies of labor supply are limited by the fact that wages are 
unobservable for non-workers.  Summary statistics in Table 2 show that 8.3 percent of the men in 
the sample are working and 5.1 percent of women are working.   The HRS job histories and 
demographic and employment information allow us to calculate a potential wage, w for all 
individuals in our sample.  We regress the respondent’s wage at their last job (adjusted by the CPI) 
on education, race, Hispanic ethnicity, industry of last job, occupation of last job, and year of 
interview, and use the estimated coefficients from this regression to predict a potential wage.
12   We 
use this potential wage in estimating (1) rather than the self-reported prior wage, because the 
reported wage may have measurement error that varies systematically with one’s taste for leisure.  
Specifically, the prior wage will be a noisier measure of the potential wage for respondents who 
have been out of the labor force longer, who may have a stronger taste for leisure.  
Using the National Bureau of Economic Research’s TAXSIM program for each year of the 
survey, we calculate the marginal tax rate that each household faces, τ.
13  The marginal tax rate is a 
function of household size, income and state of residence.  Because we want to estimate the effect 
of tax rates and wages on the work decision, we hold hours of work constant at zero hours for all 
respondents for the purposes of calculating the marginal tax rate. We use the marginal tax rate 
facing the first dollar earned rather than the observed marginal tax rate given their actual earnings.  
This is because the latter is a function of the individual’s chosen hours of work, while the former is 
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size, nonlabor income and state of residence and set all wage and salary income to zero before 
running TAXSIM. For married couples, we set earnings of both spouses to zero, and we use the 
same marginal tax rate for both spouses.  
Variation in τ, the marginal tax rate, comes from variation at both the state and the 
individual level.  First, τ will be higher in states with higher tax rates.  Second, among individuals 
with pension or Social Security income, τ  will be higher in states that tax these types of income.  
Third, given a graduated tax structure, τ  will be higher for individuals with higher income.  We 
would like our coefficient to tell us the effect on labor force participation if we changed the tax rate 
incrementally, but held constant an individual’s other income and wealth and anything else that 
might affect their labor supply.  To do this, we explicitly control for nonlabor income, labor market 
characteristics and other variables that may be correlated with τ  (discussed in detail below).  Thus, 
we can interpret the coefficient on ln(1 ) τ − as the effect on labor force participation to the payoff to 
working that arises solely from the variation in the interaction of a household’s nonlabor income 
and their state of residence.
14  The mean marginal tax rate on the first dollar earned is 
approximately 25 percent, with a standard deviation of roughly 13 percentage points, suggesting 
that there is a substantial amount of variation in these tax rates across the individuals in our sample.   
  Our measure of nonlabor income, I, is an after-tax measure that includes all non-wage 
income at the household level.
15  Working men have an average of about $34,000 of nonlabor 
income while nonworking men have an average of about $37,000.  It is not surprising that nonlabor 
income is significantly higher among male nonworkers than male workers of the same gender, 
given that nonworkers are more likely to collect both Social Security and pension benefits.  In 
addition, time spent on leisure usually increases with income.  Women have nonlabor income of 
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not.  We scale household nonlabor income by 0.75 for married couples to account for economies of 
scale.  We also control for whether the respondent is a homeowner or receives any pension income 
as proxies for financial security.  Among both men and women, a significantly lower percentage of 
workers have pensions than nonworkers.  While working men have significantly higher home 
ownership rates than nonworking men, homeownership rates do not differ significantly between 
female workers and nonworkers.   
Since households can also draw on their assets to supplement retirement income, we include 
the following asset values: home equity, IRAs, balances in defined contribution (DC) pension plans, 
and other wealth, which includes other real estate, stocks, bonds, certificates of deposit (CDs), bank 
balances, and automobile wealth.  As with nonlabor income, we scale these measures of wealth by 
0.75 for married households to account for economies of scale.  We also include a measure of debt.     
Means in Table 2 do not show consistent differences in wealth among workers and nonworkers. 
Male workers have significantly lower levels of pension receipt and higher levels of 
homeownership than male nonworkers.  Male and female workers have significantly higher levels 
of debts and DC pension balances. The higher level of DC pension balances among workers is 
likely due to the fact that upon leaving a firm, DC pension balances are often converted to IRAs or 
annuities.  In addition, DC pension balances may be more subject to underreporting among 
nonworkers.
16  Nonworking women have significantly higher levels of other wealth than working 
women, but there are no significant differences in these variables between working and nonworking 
men. 
While we treat nonlabor income as exogenous to current labor supply decisions, it is clear 
that both assets and pension income are a function of past labor force decisions, and are therefore 
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supply decision.  However, if those with higher assets and nonlabor income had stronger 
preferences for work, we would expect this bias to lead to a positive relationship between nonlabor 
income and labor supply.  This would bias us against finding the negative relationship that would be 
predicted by theory.   
The X vector includes indicator variables for single year of age, since, as illustrated in Figure 
2, there is a strong negative relationship between age and labor supply for this group.  It also 
controls for marital status, health status (indicators for in excellent or very good health, in fair or 
poor health, with good health as the excluded category), and a series of expectations variables.  
These variables control for differences in expectations about the economy or financial security that 
might also affect the decision to return to work. The HRS asks respondents to report on a scale from 
0 to 100 how likely it is that: a) their income will keep up with inflation for the next five years; b) 
that they will leave an inheritance of $10,000 or more; and c) that they will need to give major 
financial help to family members over the next ten years.  Female nonworkers report a higher 
probability of giving financial help to family members than do female workers, but workers and 
nonworkers do not differ significantly in other expectations.     
B.  Estimating Determinants of Hours Worked  
  The factors that influence whether an individual works should also influence how many 
hours they work.  Although prime age workers may not have much control over how many hours 
they work (see Card (1990), Altonji and Paxson (1988), and Hausman (1980)), retirees may exhibit 
greater elasticity in their hours decision, given the significant amount of nonlabor income received 
by many of them.  This may be particularly true if the nonpecuniary benefits of work such as 
staying active and social are important.  
   12  Analogous to equation (1) we estimate the following model of hours worked 
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Because most retirees do not work, H=0 for the majority of the sample, and OLS is not an 
appropriate method to estimate (3) among the sample of all retirees. We address this by restricting 
our sample to the sample of workers with positive hours of work.
17   For this sample of workers, we 
use the marginal tax rate that workers would face if they worked full time.
18  To do this, we impute 
full time earnings using the potential wage estimated in the prior section. For married couples, we 
do this assuming the higher earner works full time.   
V.  Results 
A.  Participation 
Estimated marginal effects and their standard errors from estimation of (1) by logistic 
regression can be found in Table 3.
19  We estimate separate equations for men and women.  We 
estimate a positive and statistically significant effect of the log potential wage for both men and 
women.  The marginal effect implies that a one percent increase in the wage is associated with an 
increase in the probability of work of 0.00043 percentage points for men and 0.00023 percentage 
points for women.
20   Given that 8.3 percent of the men and 5.1 percent of the women are working, 
our estimates are that a 10 percent increase in the wage would raise participation by 5.2 percent for 
men and 4.5 percent for women.   
The estimated effect of ln(1 ) τ −  is also positive and statistically significant at the five-
percent level for both men and women, suggesting that a one percent increase in (1 ) τ − , leads to an 
increase in the probability of working of 0.00063 percentage points for men and 0.00059 for 
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increased participation of 7.5 percent among men and 11.4 percent among women.   
Since the estimates are from a nonlinear model, the estimated effect of the tax rate will vary 
across individuals.  To get another sense of the magnitude, we can consider an elderly man living in 
Wisconsin with $36,000 of nonlabor income (made up of Social Security and pension income) who 
would face a marginal tax rate of 32.9 percent on the first dollar he would earn in 2002.  If he 
moved to Michigan, he would face a marginal tax rate of 22.5 percent. This means that he would 
earn 15.5 percent more for every dollar in Michigan than in Wisconsin. Our model predicts that the 
probability that he would work is 1 percentage point higher in Michigan than it would be in 
Wisconsin. Given that the participation rate among men is 8.3 percent, the lower tax rate in 
Michigan makes him about 12 percent more likely to work. The combined results from the wage 
and tax rate coefficients suggest that labor force participation of the elderly is quite responsive to 
the payoff to working.   
The estimated coefficient on nonlabor income is not statistically different from zero for men, 
and is positive and significant for women, which is inconsistent with with a standard labor supply 
model in which leisure is considered to be a normal good.  However, this finding is consistent with 
work by Haider and Loughran (2001) and Maestas (2004) that suggests that return to work among 
retirees is more likely among those in the best financial position.  It would also be consistent with a 
correlation between nonlabor income and unobservable tastes for work. 
Estimates for other variables are generally consistent with the differences between workers 
and non-workers observed in Table 2.  Across some variables, both male and female workers seem 
to be in worse financial shape than non-workers.  Those with pensions, with greater home equity, 
and with higher debt are less likely to work.  Married men are more likely to work, and those in 
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level unemployment rate significantly affects the work behavior of both male and female retirees -- 
a one percent increase in the unemployment rate is associated with lower labor force participation of 
0.00415 percentage points for men and 0.00188 percentage points for women.  These estimates 
could suggest that older workers face the same type of cyclicality experienced by prime-age 
workers.   
We next run regressions separately by for those with different levels of nonlabor income, 
dividing our sample into thirds, to test whether the responsiveness of labor supply to the variables of 
interest varies by income level.  Results in Table 4 show that for both men and women, there is not 
much variation in the responsiveness of labor supply to our measure of the potential wage – for each 
third of the nonlabor income distribution, higher potential wages lead to increased labor supply for 
both men and women.  Men in the lower third and women in the middle third of the distribution of 
nonlabor income are most responsive to the tax rate.  For men, the labor supply of those in the 
middle third of the distribution of nonlabor income is the most responsive to the level of nonlabor 
income.  Among women, there are interesting differences by in the responsiveness to nonlabor 
income. Among the middle third, greater nonlabor income is associated with reduced participation, 
as expected by theory, but among both the poorest and the richest thirds, greater nonlabor income is 
associated with greater participation.  It could be the case that those with greater pension and Social 
Security Income have worked longer and harder, which may reflect greater tastes for work both in 
their working and in their elderly years.
 21  In addition, it is possible that for wealthy elderly women, 
labor supply is more like leisure than work. 
Declines in health may limit the labor supply of many of the elderly.  The estimates just 
presented may understate the importance of wages and taxes if a significant portion of the sample is 
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equations separately by the self-reported health status of the respondent.  These results are presented 
in Table 5.  Labor supply responds to the potential wage and the tax rate for men who report their 
health status to be excellent, very good, or good, but not for those who are in fair or poor health 
status.  For women, labor supply responds to the potential wage throughout the health distribution, 
but there appears to be a health gradient.  Those in the best self-reported health respond the most to 
the potential wage, while those in worse self-reported health respond the least.  A similar pattern 
appears with the tax rate, with those in the best self-reported health responding the most to higher 
taxes.   
B.  Hours 
  Table 6 presents results for equation (2), estimating the determinants of hours worked 
among workers.  Neither the potential wage nor the marginal tax rate has coefficients that are 
statistically different from zero for either male or female workers.  Those with greater nonlabor 
income work fewer hours, and the effect is statistically significant at the five-percent level for 
women.   
The estimated effects of some covariates on hours worked are quite different than those on 
participation. The county unemployment rate, which had a large effect on the participation decision, 
has no significant effect on hours among those who are working.   Similarly, while marital status 
had a significant effect on participation, it has no effect on hours worked among workers.
22   
VI.  Discussion 
  Our results suggest that the labor force participation decisions of elderly Americans are 
responsive to economic factors.  We find that a 10 percent increase in the (gross) potential wage is 
associated with labor force participation rates that are four to five percent higher for men and 
   16women.   We also find that older workers are responsive on the extensive margin of participation to 
the financial payoff from working generated by the tax code.  Our estimates are that a reduction in 
the marginal tax rate that would increase the payoff to working by 10 percent would increase labor 
force participation by 7.5 percent among men and 11.4 percent among women.  Consistent with 
previous literature, we find that greater nonlabor income is associated with higher propensities to 
work.   
Our results also vary by the level of nonlabor income.  The tax rate appears to have the 
greatest effect among middle income individuals.  However, we find that higher wages are a 
significant predictor of increased participation across the distribution of nonlabor income.  This 
suggests that even though those with greater nonlabor income are less likely to work, they are still 
responsive to the economic payoff to working.   
We also find that the labor supply of those older workers in the best self-reported health is 
most likely to respond to economic incentives.  Continued improvements in the health of the elderly 
due to medical advances are likely, which suggest that a larger fraction of the elderly population in 
the future may respond positively to labor supply incentives.  The responsiveness of older workers 
to the tax code suggests that public policy could influence elderly labor supply through this 
mechanism.  This could prove extremely important in coming years as a greater share of the 
potential workforce reaches and passes the age of 65. 
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Table 1: Selected Features of State Tax Systems in 2003 
                       
  
Social Security 
Taxed?   
Tax Exemption for 
Private Pension   
Highest Marginal Tax 
Rate on Earnings   
            
 Alabama    No    full  3.25   
 Alaska  No    full  0   
 Arizona    No    0  4.93   
 Arkansas  No    6000  7.43   
 California  No    0  9.86   
 Colorado  Yes    24000  4.77   
 Connecticut  Yes    0  5   
 Delaware  No    12500  6.13   
 DC  No    0  9.4   
 Florida  No    full  0   
 Georgia    No    15000  5.83   
 Hawaii  No    full  8.04   
 Idaho  No    0  7.89   
 Illinois  No    full  3   
 Indiana  No    0  3.4   
 Iowa  Yes    6000  8.38   
 Kansas    Yes    0  6.51   
 Kentucky  No    39400  6.18   
 Louisiana    No    6000  3.92   
 Maine    No    6000  8.75   
 Maryland    No    19900  4.83   
 Massachusetts    No    0  5.3   
 Michigan  No    37710  4   
 Minnesota  Yes    0  8.09   
 Mississippi  No    full  4.93   
 Missouri  Yes    6000  5.91   
 Montana  Yes    3600  7.66   
 Nebraska  Yes    0  7.65   
 Nevada  No    full  0   
 New  Hampshire  No    full  0   
 New  Jersey  No    15000  6.37   
 New  Mexico  Yes    0  7.81   
 New  York  No    20000  7.7   
 North  Carolina  No    2000  8.5   
 North  Dakota  Yes    0  5.41   
  Ohio  No    credit of 200  7.5   
 Oklahoma  No    5500  6.38   
  Oregon  No    credit of 9%  9.1   
 Pennsylvania  No    full  2.8   
 Rhode  Island  Yes    0  9.28   
 South  Carolina  No    10000  7.09   
 South  Dakota  No    full  0   
 Tennessee  No    full  0   
 Texas  No    full  0   
 Utah  Yes    7500  5.91      21
 Vermont  Yes    0  8.5   
 Virginia  No    0  5.83   
 Washington  No    full  0   
 West  Virginia  Yes    0  6.5   
 Wisconsin  Yes    0  6.75   
    Wyoming  No    full   0    
  Source: Wisconsin Legislative Fiscal Bureau (2005)          22
Table 2: Summary Statistics by Gender and Work Status 
HRS Respondents ages 70-84 in 1998, 2000, or 2002 
                                 
 Men    Women 
  Working  Not Working     Working  Not Working 
  (n=441; 8.3%)  (n=4844; 91.7%)    (n=282; 5.1%)  (n=5209; 94.9%) 
  Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.   Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Wage 10.70  17.13  24.39  431.93    10.70  23.54  6.82  17.92 
After-tax potential wage  7.86  13.94  16.58  286.73    8.09  19.32  4.83  12.41 
MTR faced on First Dollar Earned  0.25  0.14  0.27  0.14    0.23  0.12  0.26  0.13 
After-tax Unearned Income  33,930  26,883  36,696  47,756    29,396 39,030  29,401  38,676 
Unemployment rate in county  0.05  0.02  0.05  0.02    0.05  0.02  0.05  0.02 
Retired  0.53 0.50  0.97 0.16    0.28  0.45  0.80 0.40 
Age  73.31 3.35  76.06 4.15    73.87  3.67  76.35 4.25 
Married  0.87 0.33  0.77 0.42    0.48  0.50  0.43 0.50 
Years of Education  12.51  3.39  11.58  3.74    12.77  2.53  11.93  3.04 
Black  Race  0.10 0.30  0.11 0.32    0.10  0.29  0.13 0.34 
Hispanic  0.05 0.21  0.06 0.24    0.02  0.14  0.05 0.22 
Health=Exc,  Very  Good  0.46 0.50  0.30 0.46    0.61  0.49  0.34 0.47 
Health=Fair/Poor  0.17 0.38  0.36 0.48    0.12  0.33  0.33 0.47 
Has  Pension  0.59 0.49  0.71 0.45    0.58  0.49  0.62 0.49 
Home  Owner  0.88 0.33  0.83 0.38    0.80  0.40  0.79 0.41 
Home  Equity  91,952 156,920  88,447 160,147    72,937 79,288  86,077 149,169 
IRA  Balances  36,948 92,419  33,145 87,520    21,703 64,516  27,217  144,904 
DC Pension Balances  13,989  112,952  567 23,930    1,652  11,367  27  1,006 
Other Wealth  128,455 372,798  141,139  483,387    83,170 177,814  119,043 292,010 
Debts -1,489  4,920  -858  4,165    -4,676  44,932  -860  7,261 
Expect  Inflation  47.46 29.59  49.05 32.40    44.82  32.75  44.55 31.48 
Expect to Leave Inheritance  72.29  33.21  70.90  35.85    61.79  39.38  63.61  39.08 
Expect to Help Family Financially  34.74  35.09    33.84  35.51     16.81  26.41    23.30  32.15 
Notes: The tax rate is the marginal tax rate the respondent would face on the first dollar they earn. The wage is the wage at their prior job, adjusted by CPI.  
See text for other variable definitions.                   23
Table 3: Logit Estimates of Whether Respondent is Currently Working,  
Among HRS Respondents Ages 70-84 in 1998, 2000, or 2002 
                      
   Men   Women 
  
Marginal Effect 
(Standard Error)     
Marginal Effect 
(Standard Error)   
 ln(Wage)  0.043  **   0.023  **   
   (0.013)     (0.007)    
 ln(1-τ) 0.063  **   0.059  **   
   (0.025)     (0.017)    
 ln(Unearned  income)  0.002     0.011  **   
   (0.004)     (0.005)    
  Unemployment rate in county  -0.415  **   -0.188  *   
   (0.205)     (0.102)    
 Married  0.018  *   -0.008    
   (0.008)     (0.005)    
 Health=Exc,  Very  Good  0.010     0.027  **   
   (0.007)     (0.006)    
 Health=Fair/Poor  -0.038  **   -0.016  **   
   (0.007)     (0.005)    
 Has  Pension  -0.031  **   -0.011  **   
   (0.009)     (0.005)    
 Home  Owner  0.010     0.006    
   (0.009)     (0.005)    
 Home  Equity  0.000     -0.001 *   
   (0.0005)     (0.0004)    
 Other  Wealth  -0.00004     -0.00011    
   (0.0001)     (0.0001)    
 Debts  -0.01254  **   -0.00338  **   
   (0.0056)     (0.0011)    
 IRA  Balances  -0.00052     -0.00051    
   (0.0005)     (0.0004)    
  DC Pension Balances  0.00174  *   0.02191  **   
   (0.001)     (0.008)    
 Expect  Inflation  -0.00018  *   0.00005    
   (0.0001)     (0.0001)    
  Expect to Leave Inheritance  0.00005     -0.00007    
   (0.0001)     (0.0001)    
  Expect to Help Family Financially  -0.00006     -0.00022  **   
   (0.0001)     (0.0001)    
  Mean of Y  0.083      0.051     
 N  5,285      5,491    
  Pseudo R-squared  0.149        0.160      
Notes: ** Denotes statistical significance at the 5% level and * at the 10% level.      
Includes dummy variables for state and age. The wage is a predicted potential wage (see text for details).      24
The tax rate is the marginal tax rate the respondent would face on the first dollar they earn.      
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Table 4: Logit Estimates of Whether Respondent is Currently Working, by Income Third 
Among HRS Respondents Ages 70-84 in 1998, 2000, or 2002 
                     
   Men Women 
  
Marginal Effect 
(Standard Error)   
Marginal Effect 
(Standard Error)   
Poorest Third        
 ln(Wage)  0.038     0.014  **  
   (0.147)    (0.007)    
 ln(1-τ) 0.191     0.033     
   (0634)    (0.069)    
 ln(Unearned  income)  0.004     0.013  **   
   (0.013)    (0.006)    
  Mean of Y  0.089   0.052     
 N  1,727   1,830     
 Pseudo  R-squared  0.226   0.254     
           
Middle Third          
 ln(Wage)  0.052  **   0.026  *   
   (0.024)    (0.014)    
 ln(1-τ) 0.047     0.207  **   
   (0.063)    (0.061)    
 ln(Unearned  income)  -0.050     -0.006     
   (0.043)    (0.029)    
  Mean of Y  0.093   0.069     
 N  1,599   1,633     
 Pseudo  R-squared  0.181   0.137     
           
Richest Third          
 ln(Wage)  0.046  *   0.027  **   
   (0.026)    (0.009)    
 ln(1-τ) 0.014     0.020     
   (0.045)    (0.018)    
 ln(Unearned  income)  0.003     0.014  **   
   (0.014)    (0.006)    
           
  Mean of Y  0.092   0.041     
 N  1,505   1,784     
   Pseudo R-squared  0.158       0.204      
Notes: ** Denotes statistical significance at the 5% level and * at the 10% level.     
Includes all control variables listed in Table 3, as well as dummy variables for state and age. The wage is a   
predicted potential wage (see text for details).  The tax rate is the marginal tax rate the respondent would face 
 on the first dollar they earn.           
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Table 5: Logit Estimates of Whether Respondent is Currently Working, 
 by Self Reported Health Status 
Among HRS Respondents Ages 70-84 in 1998, 2000, or 2002 
                     
   Men Women 
  
Marginal Effect (Standard 
Error)  
Marginal Effect (Standard 
Error)  
Health=Excellent or Very Good        
 ln(Wage)  0.055  **   0.043  **  
   (0.024)    (0.018) 
   
 ln(1-τ) 0.105  *   0.134  **   
   (0.058)    (0.044)    
 ln(Unearned  income)  0.020     0.035  **   
   (0.014)    (0.013)    
  Mean of Y  0.120   0.089    
 N  1,676   1,946    
 Pseudo  R-squared  0.164   0.158    
           
Health=Good          
 ln(Wage)  0.078  **   0.025  **   
   (0.024)    (0.011)    
 ln(1-τ) 0.084  **   0.067  **   
   (0.039)    (0.027)    
 ln(Unearned  income)  -0.00005     0.003     
   (0.006)    (0.004)    
  Mean of Y  0.100   0.050    
 N  1,637   1,515    
 Pseudo  R-squared  0.164   0.157    
           
Health=Fair or Poor          
 ln(Wage)  0.007     0.015  **   
   (0.015)    (0.005)    
 ln(1-τ) 0.031     0.007     
   (0.031)    (0.019)    
 ln(Unearned  income)  -0.002     0.008     
   (0.003)    (0.006)    
           
  Mean of Y  0.058   0.031    
 N  1,321   1,102    
  Pseudo R-squared  0.167       0.144      
Notes: ** Denotes statistical significance at the 5% level and * at the 10% level.     
Includes all control variables listed in Table 3, as well as dummy variables for state and age. The wage is a   
predicted potential wage (see text for details).  The tax rate is the marginal tax rate the respondent would face 
 on the first dollar they earn.             27
 
Table 6: OLS Estimates of Log Hours Worked, 
Among HRS Respondents Working for Pay, Ages 70-84 in 1998, 2000, or 2002 
                     
   Men Women   
  
Coefficient 
(Standard Error)   
Coefficient 
(Standard Error)     
 ln(Wage)  -0.102    0.087     
   (0.153)    (0.218)     
 ln(1-τ) -0.074    0.010     
   (0.248)    (0.293)     
 ln(Unearned  income)  -0.079    -0.175  **   
   (0.048)    (0.087)     
  Unemployment rate in county  -0.552    -2.697     
   (2.289)    (2.335)     
 Married  0.003    0.117     
   (0.109)    (0.101)     
 Health=Exc,  Very  Good  0.081    -0.070     
   (0.088)    (0.083)     
 Health=Fair/Poor  0.072    -0.164     
   (0.098)    (0.142)     
 Has  Pension  -0.178  *  -0.018     
   (0.093)    (0.105)     
 Home  Owner  -0.017    -0.234  **   
   (0.118)    (0.094)     
 Home  Equity  0.000    -0.002     
   (0.007)    (0.004)     
 Other  Wealth  0.001    -0.003     
   (0.002)    (0.002)     
 Debts  0.282  **  -0.011  *   
   (0.117)    (0.006)     
 IRA  Balances  -0.012  **  -0.001     
   (0.006)    (0.011)     
  DC Pension Balances  0.004    0.084  **   
   (0.005)    (0.026)     
 Expect  Inflation  0.001    0.000     
   (0.002)    (0.002)     
  Expect to Leave Inheritance  -0.002    0.001     
   (0.001)    (0.001)     
  Expect to Help Family Financially  0.001    -0.001     
   (0.001)    (0.002)     
  Mean of Y  24.75   22.15    
 N  2,786   369     
  R-squared  0.279      0.229      
Notes: ** Denotes statistical significance at the 5% level and * at the 10% level.         28
Includes dummy variables for state and age. The wage is a predicted potential wage (see text for details).   
The tax rate is the marginal tax rate the respondent would face at full time work.      
 Appendix Table 1: OLS Regression of Log Wage 
Among HRS Respondents Ages 70-84 in 1998, 2000, or 2002 
                              
   Men Women 
   All   Workers   All   Workers  
  Age  0.341  **  0.167    0.042    0.213   
    (0.114)    (0.337)    (0.14)    (0.381)   
  Age squared  -0.002  **  -0.001     -0.001    -0.002   
    (0.001)    (0.002)    (0.001)    (0.003)   
  Black Race  0.016    -0.064    0.143  **  -0.176   
    (0.052)    (0.089)    (0.067)    (0.219)   
  Hispanic  -0.070    0.060    0.215  **  0.682  ** 
    (0.074)    (0.091)    (0.091)    (0.257)   
  Years of Education  0.052  **  0.029  **   0.069  **  0.055  ** 
    (0.006)    (0.012)    (0.009)    (0.017)   
Occupation of Last Job (Agriculture is the excluded group)              
  Mining & Construction  0.204    0.759  **   0.794  *    (dropped)  ** 
    (0.187)    (0.154)    (0.442)    (0)   
  Manufacturing: Non Durable  0.041    0.290  *   0.698    0.485  ** 
    (0.188)    (0.157)    (0.433)    (0.154)   
  Manufacturing: Durable  0.132    0.379  **   0.826  *  0.346  ** 
    (0.185)    (0.137)    (0.439)    (0.126)   
  Transportation  0.194    0.346  **   0.957  **  0.435  ** 
    (0.185)    (0.12)    (0.452)    (0.109)   
  Wholesale  0.090    0.338  **   0.890  **  0.389  * 
    (0.201)    (0.141)    (0.442)    (0.201)   
  Retail  -0.121    0.603  **   0.491    0.106   
    (0.188)    (0.136)    (0.443)    (0.106)   
  Finance, Ins., & Real Estate  -0.026    0.397  **   0.757  *  0.198  * 
    (0.198)    (0.169)    (0.438)    (0.109)   
  Business and Repair Services  -0.014    0.404  **   0.759  *  0.091   
     (0.19)    (0.138)       (0.456)    (0.195)    
                    
   29Appendix Table 1: OLS Regression of Log Wage (continued) 
Among HRS Respondents Ages 65-85 in 1998, 2000, or 2002 
                              
   Men Women 
   All   Workers   All   Workers  
  Personal Services  -0.336    0.437  **   0.453    0.008   
    (0.235)    (0.152)    (0.45)    (0.194)   
  Entertainment & Recreation  0.154    -0.042    0.815    0.177   
    (0.291)    (0.392)    (0.595)    (0.132)   
  Professional and Related Services  0.057    0.571  **   0.600    0.312  ** 
    (0.186)    (0.193)    (0.433)    (0.081)   
  Public Administration  0.189    0.311  *   0.933  **  0.233  * 
    (0.19)    (0.172)    (0.436)    (0.125)   
  Not Known  0.086    0.177    0.808  *  -0.343   
   (0.201)    (0.118)    (0.445)    (0.379)   
Industry of Last Job (Managerial is the excluded group)             
  Professional Specialty Operation  -0.012    0.238     -0.012    -0.166   
    (0.058)    (0.203)    (0.078)    (0.168)   
  Sales  -0.056    -0.332  **   -0.336  **  -0.138   
    (0.088)    (0.135)    (0.103)    (0.123)   
  Clerical and Administrative Support  -0.456  **  -0.209     -0.383  **  -0.233   
    (0.073)    (0.157)    (0.072)    (0.143)   
  Service: Private Household cleaning & building  -0.277    -0.116     -0.631  **  -0.157   
    (0.317)    (0.195)    (0.17)    (0.267)   
  Service: Protection  -0.468  **  -0.300  **   -0.488  *  -0.368  ** 
    (0.112)    (0.13)    (0.261)    (0.148)   
  Service: Food Preparation  -0.325  **  -0.589  **   -0.437  **  -0.238  * 
    (0.161)    (0.156)    (0.123)    (0.138)   
  Health Services  -0.885  **   (dropped)  **   -0.285  **  -0.281   
    (0.239)    (0)    (0.098)    (0.18)   
  Personal Services  -0.378  **  -0.363  **   -0.400  **  -0.531  ** 
     (0.106)    (0.15)       (0.106)    (0.203)    
                    
   30   31
Appendix Table 1: OLS Regression of Log Wage (continued) 
Among HRS Respondents Ages 65-85 in 1998, 2000, or 2002 
                              
   Men Women 
   All   Workers   All   Workers  
  Farming, Forestry, and Fishing  -0.513  **  -0.179     -0.089    -0.115   
    (0.169)    (0.173)    (0.696)    (0.144)   
  Mechanics and Repair  -0.159  **  -0.146     -0.051      (dropped)   
    (0.061)    (0.124)    (0.186)    (0)   
  Construction trade and extractors  -0.212  **  -0.124     -0.872  **    (dropped)   
    (0.072)    (0.138)    (0.222)    (0)   
  Precision Production  -0.171  **  -0.041     -0.635  **  0.015   
    (0.066)    (0.198)    (0.212)    (0.26)   
  Operators: Machine  -0.387  **  -0.174     -0.663  **  -0.337  ** 
    (0.063)    (0.154)    (0.123)    (0.14)   
  Operators: Transport  -0.396  **  -0.135     -0.469    -0.482  ** 
    (0.069)    (0.124)    (0.32)    (0.153)   
  Operators: Handlers  -0.544  **  -0.364  **   -0.473  **  0.638  ** 
    (0.083)    (0.145)    (0.176)    (0.251)   
  Armed Forces  -0.938  **  -0.117     -0.727  **    (dropped)   
    (0.183)    (0.441)    (0.139)    (0)   
  Not Known  0.219     (dropped)     -0.878  **    (dropped)   
    (0.239)    (0)    (0.39)    (0)   
  Year=2000  0.033  **  0.022    0.092  **  0.128  ** 
    (0.012)    (0.052)    (0.014)    (0.063)   
  Year=2002  0.066  **  0.206  **   0.146  **  0.247  ** 
   (0.019)    (0.064)    (0.019)    (0.074)   
 Constant  -10.286  **  -4.694   0.942    -6.107  
   (4.362)   (12.689)  (5.354)   (14.337)   
  R-squared        0.229             0.207    
Notes: ** Denotes statistical significance at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. Robust standard errors in parentheses.     
The wage is the prior wage in the regression of all respondents and the current wage in the regression of current workers.        32
Appendix Table 2: OLS Estimates of  Hours Worked, 
Among All HRS Respondents, Ages 70-84 in 1998, 2000, or 2002 
                     
   Men Women   
  
Coefficient 
(Standard Error)   
Coefficient 
(Standard Error)     
 ln(Wage)  1.63  **   1.04  ** 
   (0.47)    (0.268)   
 ln(1-t)  1.46  *   1.86  ** 
   (0.798)    (0.412)   
 ln(Unearned  income)  -0.15     0.06   
   (0.177)    (0.068)   
  Unemployment rate in county  -16.14  **   -6.76  ** 
   (6.838)    (2.913)   
 Married  0.56  *   -0.04   
   (0.337)    (0.209)   
 Health=Exc,  Very  Good  0.74  **   0.97  ** 
   (0.318)    (0.23)   
 Health=Fair/Poor  -1.07  **   -0.46  ** 
   (0.251)    (0.159)   
 Has  Pension  -1.43  **   -0.38  * 
   (0.366)    (0.208)   
 Home  Owner  0.03     -0.24   
   (0.37)    (0.247)   
 Home  Equity  -0.0005     -0.0071   
   (0.011)    (0.005)   
 Other  Wealth  -0.0006     -0.0038  ** 
   (0.002)    (0.002)   
 Debts  -0.2978     -0.3495  ** 
   (0.28)    (0.079)   
 IRA  Balances  -0.0297  *   -0.0069  * 
   (0.018)    (0.004)   
  DC Pension Balances  0.2375  **   4.0285  ** 
   (0.077)    (0.589)   
  Expect to Live to 85  -0.0393  **   0.0291  ** 
   (0.013)    (0.008)   
 Expect  Inflation  -0.0073  *   0.0020   
   (0.004)    (0.004)   
  Expect to Leave Inheritance  -0.0008     -0.0032   
   (0.004)    (0.003)   
  Expect to Help Family Financially  -0.0010     -0.0071  ** 
   (0.004)    (0.003)   
  Mean of Y  2.01      1.09    
  R-squared  0.100       0.098      Notes: ** Denotes statistical significance at the 5% level and * at the 10% level.      
Includes dummy variables for state and age. The wage is a predicted potential wage (see text for details).   
The tax rate is the marginal tax rate the respondent would face at full time work.      
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1 These trends have also been reported in the popular press.  See, for instance, “Baby Boomers Delay Retirement,” 
Washington Post, April 6, 2000; “Reversing Decades-Long Trend, Americans Retiring Later in Life,” New York Times, 
February 26, 2001; and Seniors Work Longer, Take Part-Time Jobs as Portfolios Plunge,” Money Magazine, June 11, 
2001. 
2 However, their findings are based on the variation in the hours of those who are currently working and it is possible 
that the wage may be more important determining whether one works (i.e. the participation decision) than how many 
hours they work (the hours decision).   
3 See http://www.nber.org/~taxsim/state-rates/maxrate.html for comparable tax rates for other years. 
4 One concern is that some elderly households may have migrated across state in order to decrease tax exposure.  
However, the literature finds little evidence for this (e.g. Conway and Houtenville, 2001; Conway and Rork, 
forthcoming).  We do not explicitly address migration of the households in our sample. 
5 The HRS allows respondents to report their current and prior compensation as an hourly wage or daily, weekly, 
monthly or annual salary.  Because they also report the usual number of hours and weeks worked at each of these jobs, 
we are able to calculate an hourly wage.  This measure is subject to division bias, which should bias any estimated labor 
force responses downward in absolute value (see Heim, 2007).   
6 State identifiers in the HRS are available through restricted access.    
[
7 β1 and β2 should be identical theoretically, because  ] ln . This may not be the case 
empirically however, either because workers may respond differently to the wage and tax rates, or because of 
heterogeneity in the wage that may be correlated with important unobserved characteristics. 
(1 ) ln ln (1 ) ww ττ −+ = −
8 Regressions run without state fixed effects provide estimates that are similar in magnitude and statistical significance. 
9 Of the men in our sample, 94% report that they are retired (97% of those not working and 53% of those working), 
compared to 78% of women (80% of those not working and 28% of those working).   
10 A tremendous literature exists on the determinants of retirement timing and it is not the goal of this project to enhance 
that literature. See for example Stock and Wise (1990).   
11 Specifically, we exclude those who were self-employed during any wave of the HRS, as well as those who report 
being self-employed in their previous job. 
12 Estimates from the prediction regression can be found in Appendix Table 1.   
13 TAXSIM is freely available at http://www.nber.org/taxsim/.  The program is thoroughly described in Feenberg and 
Coutts (1993).   
14 Like income taxes, the Social Security earnings test may also reduce the payoff to working. However, since we focus 
our analysis on the population 70 and older, the earnings test does not apply. 
15 We calculate the taxes that would be owed when earnings equal zero.  
16 It is possible that changes in the value of assets, perhaps due to changes in stock prices over the time period of our 
sample, could themselves cause changes in labor supply.  The evidence on the effects of such changes is mixed (see 
Kezdi and Sevak (2004) and Eschtruth and Gemus (2002).  By controlling for year effects and the value of the assets, 
we partially control for such effects.   
17 We have estimated OLS and tobit regressions among the full sample of potential workers and our results mirror those 
of the participation equations [See Appendix Table 2].  Because most retirees report zero hours, this suggests that the 
dynamics of the participation decision dominate any dynamics of the hours decision when hours regressions are 
estimated on the full sample.  
18 We have also estimated specifications where we allow hours to be affected by both the marginal tax rate at full time 
hours and the marginal tax rate on the first dollar of income.  We find no evidence that hours worked responds 
differently to these two tax rates.   
19 Coefficients available from the authors upon request.  
20 For right hand side variables that are in ln(X) form, it is necessary to divide the marginal effect by 100 to get the 
effect of a one percent increase in the variable X.  
21 We have also estimated regressions separately by self-reported health status (breaking out those who report their 
health to be “excellent/very good” from those who report their health to be “good” and those who report their health to 
be “poor”).  We find few differences in labor supply response among these dimensions.   
22 We have also examined whether our hours results differ by income level, and find no differences in the 
responsiveness by groups.  However, this could be due to the fact that the sample size (the number of workers and then 
stratified into a number of categories) becomes reduced, and coefficients are less precisely estimated.   
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